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ABSTRACT 
 
Quebec, the only province within Canada to follow the civil law 
tradition, is an ideal microcosm for the study of unity and diversity 
within legal orders. The question of whether Quebec’s civilian legal 
tradition should be interpreted and applied so as to be in unity with 
the common law or, rather, adhere to its own distinct legal culture 
has pervaded doctrine and jurisprudence for over a century. Inter-
estingly, the pendulum has swung widely. Quebec has seen moments 
when the philosophy of the Supreme Court of Canada was one of 
unification and harmonization of Quebec law with the common law 
tradition, as well as moments when it advanced staunch diversity.  
The situation today is more nuanced. Quebec’s civilian tradition 
has undoubtedly survived as a distinct legal order within Canada 
                                                                                                             
 ∗  Professor and member of the Paul-André Crépeau Centre for Private and 
Comparative Law, Faculty of Law, McGill University. The author wishes to thank 
McGill law student, Julia Atack for her invaluable research assistance, generously 
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due to legal interpretation but also interdisciplinary factors, includ-
ing language and politics. Even within areas borrowed through le-
gal transplantation from the common law, Quebec maintains a dis-
tinct civilian methodology and interpretation and the Supreme 
Court has held that Canada’s legal traditions should continue to 
evolve side by side, each maintaining its distinctive character. Di-
versity, however, has been recently tempered by a growth in com-
parative law as between Canada’s legal traditions. Increasingly, the 
Supreme Court is looking to Quebec civil law in appeals from com-
mon law provinces and Quebec continues to look to the common law 
in many areas. However, far from leading to unity, comparative law 
in Canada has been used as a tool for information, education and, 
most importantly, inspiration. 
 
Keywords: comparative law, legal traditions, mixed jurisdictions, 
judicial methodology 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Quebec, the only province within Canada to follow the civil law 
tradition, is an ideal microcosm for the study of unity and diversity 
within legal orders. Canada is a bijural country because of the pres-
ence of the French civil law tradition, which applies in private law 
matters in Quebec, and the English common law tradition character-
istic of the rest of Canada.1 For over a century, jurists have debated 
the status of the civil law tradition within the common law nation 
and have questioned how, and sometimes whether, the two tradi-
tions can co-exist. This article will examine three general trends that 
have emerged in response to this debate; three different ways to im-
agine the relationship between Quebec’s civilian tradition and the 
broader Canadian common law legal system. These trends reflect 
the philosophies of unification, diversification and, more recently, 
of inspiration and cross-fertilization of ideas between these two tra-
ditions.  
                                                                                                             
 1. Canada has more than the two legal traditions of the civil and the common 
law. In particular, it also has indigenous legal traditions. However, the focus of 
this paper will be on the relationship between the civil and common law traditions. 
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Over Canada’s 150-year history, the pendulum has swung 
widely between unification and diversification. Towards the end of 
the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court of Canada was largely 
motivated by a philosophy of unification, which had the effect of 
making Quebec civil law more compatible with the common law.2 
However, by the end of the first decade of the twentieth century, 
prominent Quebec jurists began to reject this approach and to ad-
vance instead a philosophy of staunch diversification emphasizing 
the civilian tradition’s distinctiveness from the common law.3 The 
situation today is more nuanced. While Quebec’s civilian tradition 
has undoubtedly survived as a distinct legal order within Canada, 
the emphasis on diversity has recently been tempered by a growth 
in comparative law between Canada’s legal traditions. In recent 
years, we have seen the Supreme Court of Canada increasingly look 
to Quebec civil law in appeals from common law provinces, and to 
the common law in appeals from Quebec, embracing the concept of 
learning from the other.4 This does not, however, imply a return to 
earlier attempts to harmonize or unify Canadian civil and common 
law traditions. Rather, it represents an emergent trend, one of inspi-
ration, in which courts use comparative law as a tool for information 
and education, as a positive influence in the development of each 
distinct legal tradition.  
By focusing on these three trends, this article will examine the 
dialectic and changing relationship between Quebec civil law and 
                                                                                                             
 2. David Howes, From Polyjurality to Monojurality: The Transformation of 
Quebec Law, 1875-1929, 32 MCGILL L.J. 523, 526 (1986-1987). See also Charles 
D. Gonthier, Some Comments on the Common Law and the Civil Law in Canada: 
Influences, Parallel Developments and Borrowings, 21 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 323, 
326 (1992-1993). 
 3. Sylvio Normand, Un thème dominant de la pensée juridique tradition-
nelle au Québec : La sauvegarde de l’intégrité du droit civil, 32 MCGILL L.J. 559, 
564 (1986-1987). 
 4. This trend, while not as pronounced, can be found in lower court deci-
sions as well. See, e.g., Opron Construction Co. v. Alberta (1994) 151 A.R. 241 
(Can. Alta. Q.B.) (an Alberta common law case citing Quebec law on duty to 
disclose) [hereinafter Opron Construction Co.]; and Churchill Falls (Labrador) 
Corporation Ltd. v. Hydro-Québec, 2016 QCCA 1229 (Can. Que.) (a Quebec 
Court of Appeal decision citing the common law on good faith). 
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Canadian common law. Many protagonists have helped shape this 
relationship, from the early Supreme Court justices Henri-Elzéar 
Taschereau and Pierre-Basile Mignault, to Justice Louis LeBel, who 
served on the same Court roughly one century later. Their voices are 
crucial in understanding the philosophies they helped develop. Be-
fore examining these figures and these ideological movements, 
however, it is important to explain Quebec’s position as a mixed 
jurisdiction and the only Canadian province with a civilian legal tra-
dition.  
II. QUEBEC AND THE CANADIAN LEGAL LANDSCAPE 
Quebec enjoys a unique legal position in Canada, which stems 
from its history as having been a French colony before becoming a 
British one. Quebec passed from French to British control after the 
English conquest in the Battle of the Plains of Abraham in 1759, 
affirmed by the Treaty of Paris of 1763.5 However, a seminal mo-
ment in Canadian legal history occurred a decade later, in 1774, 
when the British Parliament enacted the Quebec Act.6 This Act was 
aimed largely at appeasing the colony’s French-Canadian popula-
tion by guaranteeing them the continued use of the French language, 
the maintenance of their Catholic religion, and the application of 
French law in private matters. Public law, however, remained gov-
erned by the English common law system. In this way, two legal 
systems found their home in Quebec. 
This bijurality was preserved in the British North America Act 
(today, the Constitution Act), which established Canada as a Con-
federation in 1867. The Canadian Constitution divided powers be-
tween the federal and provincial governments, leaving provinces the 
                                                                                                             
 5. The Definitive Treaty of Peace and Friendship (The Treaty of Paris), Feb. 
10, 1763, 15 R.A.T.F. 66. 
 6. The Quebec Act, 1774, 14 Geo. 3, c. 83, § VII (U.K.). 
2018] CANADA’S LEGAL TRADITIONS 79 
 
 
 
control over many areas of private law, such as contracts, extra-con-
tractual responsibility (torts), property, successions, and procedure.7 
Accordingly, in Quebec, these aspects of private law continued to 
be regulated by a codified civilian legal tradition.8 Areas of law fall-
ing under federal jurisdiction, such as criminal law, banking, and 
bankruptcy, became regulated uniformly by the federal government 
under a common law framework.9 As such, Quebec is a mixed ju-
risdiction that maintains its historically unique position within Can-
ada as the only one of ten provinces and three territories to follow 
both civilian and common law traditions. 
Quebec is a mixed jurisdiction in other respects as well. As ju-
dicial institutions are uniform across Canada, Quebec courts, like 
those of other provinces, are modeled on the English system and are 
courts of inherent jurisdiction.10 There is one final appellate court in 
the country, the Supreme Court of Canada, which reviews all mat-
ters of Canadian law: private, public, provincial, federal, civil law 
and common law. Three out of the nine Supreme Court judges must 
come from Quebec.11 Moreover, while Quebec judges apply sub-
stantive civil law to private matters, they are similar, in style, to their 
common law counterparts in many ways. They are nominated from 
the Bar as opposed to educated in an École de la Magistrature. Their 
decisions are written in a similar manner to English common law 
judgments in the sense that they are discursive and personalized, in-
clude dissents, and refer to precedent, although Quebec does not ad-
here to a formal system of stare decisis.12 Finally, while procedural 
                                                                                                             
 7. Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3, §§ 92(13) to 92(14) (U.K.), 
reprinted in R.S.C. 1985, app. II, No. 5 (Can.) [hereinafter Constitution Act, 
1867]. 
 8. Quebec has both a Civil Code, the first version of which came into force 
in 1866, and a Code of Civil Procedure, which first came into effect in 1867. 
 9. See Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 7, §§ 91(15), 91(21), 91(26). 
 10. Hétu v. Notre-Dame-de-Lourdes (Municipalité de), 2005 QCCA 199, pa-
ras. 35-47 (Can. Que.); I.H. Jacob, The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court, 23 
CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 23, 23 (1970). 
 11. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, §§ 3, 6 (Can.). 
 12. Rosalie Jukier, Inside the Judicial Mind: Exploring Judicial Methodology 
in the Mixed Legal System of Quebec, 6 J. COMP. L. 54, 59 (2011). 
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law in Quebec is codified and thus in a civilian format, its content is 
largely inspired by the common law adversarial process, as opposed 
to the continental inquisitorial one, and it is focused on oral advo-
cacy and driven by common law rules of evidence and procedure.13 
III. THE UNIFICATION MODEL 
While the federal division of powers in the Constitution has al-
lowed Quebec to maintain its civilian tradition in private law, it was 
not always clear that this tradition would survive as an autonomous 
legal order in an otherwise common law country. In the decades fol-
lowing Canada’s creation in 1867, there was a distinct trend on the 
Supreme Court of Canada that favoured standardizing Canadian 
law, accomplished largely by imposing common law solutions onto 
Quebec civil law issues.14 While this trend was based on a philoso-
phy of harmonizing the law across Canada, it unfolded in a markedly 
non-reciprocal way and ultimately became a project of making the 
civil law compatible with the common law and not vice versa. Had 
this trend continued, it is possible that the civilian tradition of Que-
bec would have lost its distinctive character entirely or, at the very 
least, would not be the robust legal tradition it has become today.  
                                                                                                             
 13. Id. at 63. For example, Quebec procedure includes pre-trial discovery and 
the class action, both quintessential common law elements of procedural law. 
However, recent revisions to procedural law have significantly broadened judges’ 
powers of case management and have moved Quebec procedure somewhat closer 
to a judge-centered model. See also Rosalie Jukier, The Impact of Legal Tradi-
tions on Quebec Procedural Law: Lessons from Quebec’s New Code of Civil Pro-
cedure, 93 CANADIAN BAR REV. 1 (2015). 
 14. See, e.g., Magann v. Auger (1901), 31 S.C.R. 186 (Can.) [hereinafter 
Magann v. Auger]; Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson (1887), 14 S.C.R. 105 
(Can.) [hereinafter Canadian Pacific Ry. Co.]. Note that this case came before the 
Supreme Court again in 1891, in Canadian Pacific Railway Co. v. Robinson, 
[1891] 19 S.C.R. 292, and that this second decision was overturned by the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in Robinson v. The Canadian Pacific Railway 
(Canada), [1892] UKPC 37 (U.K.). The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
in the United Kingdom continued to review appeals from the Supreme Court of 
Canada until 1949. The Canadian Pacific Railway decision referenced in this ar-
ticle is the one decided by the Supreme Court in 1887. See also Jean-Louis Bau-
douin, L’interprétation du Code Civil Québécois par la Cour Suprême du Ca-
nada, 53 CANADIAN BAR REV. 715 (1975). 
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This philosophy of unification was prevalent in the “Taschereau 
years” of the Canadian Supreme Court. Sir Henri-Elzéar Taschereau 
was appointed as a judge of the Supreme Court in 1878, just three 
years after its creation, and served until 1906, the last four of those 
years as chief justice. Taschereau believed in standardizing and uni-
fying the laws across Canada, and saw the Court as the instrument 
of bringing the civil and common law in line with each other.15 
Taschereau argued in favour of unification for two reasons. First, he 
thought it was illogical to have contradictory answers to the same 
legal questions depending on the region of Canada in which a case 
arose. For instance, in Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson, 
Taschereau, writing for the majority, interpreted an article of the 
Civil Code of Lower Canada, the primary source for Quebec’s civil 
law at the time, on the premise that it should be consistent with the 
rest of Canadian law.16 In that case, Taschereau held that it would 
be contrary to the legislative intent behind the Civil Code that a 
widow should be compensated in damages for her husband’s death 
in Lower Canada (Quebec) when such compensation did not lie in 
Upper Canada (Ontario). To interpret the article differently would 
be to suggest that the legislator intended for such disparity whereas 
Taschereau believed the intention was, instead, to “put the law in 
both Provinces on the same footing.”17 He reasoned that, “a statute 
would not be held to mean one thing in England and another in Scot-
land. And so here, I take it, it cannot mean in Lower Canada what it 
does not mean in Upper Canada, or give a larger remedy in one 
Province than in the other.”18 In short, he interpreted the codal arti-
cle in such a way as to render it consistent with the common law 
applicable in the rest of Canada.  
                                                                                                             
 15. Howes, supra note 2, at 525-526. 
 16. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 14, at 124. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 125. 
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The second reason behind Taschereau’s philosophy of unifica-
tion was that he believed it preferable to base arguments and deci-
sions on any legal source that provided reasonable guiding princi-
ples, rather than to adhere exclusively to the sources of a particular 
legal tradition. He was open to looking beyond the Civil Code of 
Lower Canada and to using alternative sources to inform his civil 
law decisions including Roman law, sources from other countries 
and, most particularly, common law precedent.19 This approach is 
visible in Magann v. Auger, a case concerning contract formation by 
post. Here, Taschereau examined a multitude of sources including 
the approach to the same legal problem in France, a variety of doc-
trinal writings, and the Civil Code. Ultimately, however, he based 
his decision on common law precedent, concluding that, “we declare 
the law to be in the Province of Quebec upon the same footing as it 
stands in England, and in the rest of the Dominion.”20 In so doing, 
Taschereau indicated that sources like common law precedent could 
be brought in and prioritized over sources from the civilian tradition 
if they seemed more appropriate in any given situation. Unlike later 
jurists, he did not see the civil law as a distinct tradition that should 
be informed exclusively by its own particular sources. Rather, he 
believed the use of any source could be valid if it brought about a 
reasonable outcome. To Taschereau, that often meant a unified out-
come across Canada.  
In the decades following Justice Taschereau’s tenure on the 
Court, many Quebec jurists voiced opposition to this unifying ap-
proach, arguing that it threatened and undermined the civil law tra-
dition. Critics went so far as to argue that the civilian tradition might 
cease to exist if the pattern were to continue.21 A modern lens on 
Taschereau’s approach, however, has shed a more positive light on 
his philosophy. David Howes has characterized Taschereau’s will-
ingness to look across traditions as a form of “polyjurality” and has 
                                                                                                             
 19. Howes, supra note 2, at 542. 
 20. Magann v. Auger, supra note 14, at 193. 
 21. Howes, supra note 2, at 551. Normand, supra note 3, at 578-579. 
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lauded his attempt to develop pan-Canadian legal principles.22 From 
this vantage point, Taschereau sought “universally admitted rules of 
law” by looking to every available legal source, rather than narrow-
ing his vision and working within one tradition to the exclusion of 
others.23 Moreover, although Taschereau clearly favoured harmoni-
zation of Canadian law, he did not undertake this unification project 
in a conscious attempt to undermine the civilian tradition.24 While 
he was not a militant protector of the civil law, he nonetheless con-
sidered elements of it in his decisions and, on occasion, attempted 
to bring civilian principles into common law judgments.25  
However, regardless of Taschereau’s motives, unification was 
not, in practice, a reciprocal process. The philosophy of harmonizing 
the laws of Canada was frequently used to bring common law prin-
ciples into civil law cases, but never actually resulted in bringing 
civil law principles into common law ones.26 Gaps in the civil law 
were filled by importing common law ideas rather than by interpret-
ing civilian sources, such as the Civil Code, or by looking to French 
law, while the common law remained distinctive and was developed 
with exclusive reference to its own sources and concepts. This uni-
fication philosophy left little autonomy for the application of a dis-
tinct civilian tradition, and the approach eventually gave rise to a 
fear that the civil law was under threat of extinction.27 Not surpris-
ingly, this period was followed by one in which the pendulum swung 
to the other extreme and jurists adopted an opposing diversification 
                                                                                                             
 22. Howes, supra note 2, at 525-527. 
 23. Id. at 525, 558. 
 24. For instance, in 1882, Taschereau wrote to the Prime Minister suggesting 
that appeals from Quebec should only be heard by the Supreme Court in cases 
touching on criminal, constitutional, and electoral matters, that is, that the Su-
preme Court should avoid judging private law cases from Quebec entirely. This 
suggestion was based on the idea that a majority common-law court was not ide-
ally suited to judge civilian cases. See JAMES G. SNELL & FREDERICK VAUGHAN, 
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA: HISTORY OF THE INSTITUTION 30, 47 (U. of 
Toronto Press 1985). 
 25. Id. at 130. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Horn (1882), 7 S.C.R. 409 (Can.) 
(Taschereau, J., dissenting). 
 26. Baudouin, supra note 14, at 719. 
 27. Normand, supra note 3, at 578. 
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approach, arguing that the civil law tradition was unique and dis-
tinct, and should not be informed by anything other than civilian 
sources. 
IV. THE DIVERSIFICATION MODEL 
The movement away from the model of unification to one of di-
versification and legal autonomy for the civil law tradition is largely 
attributable to Justice Pierre-Basile Mignault, who served on the Ca-
nadian Supreme Court from 1918 to 1929. Mignault fervently be-
lieved that the civil law was part of Quebec’s ancestral heritage and 
had to be protected at all costs.28 Worried about the survival of the 
civilian tradition in Canada, Mignault emphasized the distinctive-
ness of the civil law and argued that it needed to be developed au-
tonomously from common law influences in order to preserve its 
identity, originality, and integrity.29  
In his decisions, Mignault emphasized the differences between 
Quebec’s laws and those of the rest of Canada, focusing more on 
what was unique about the civil law as opposed to Taschereau’s ap-
proach, which focused on what was universal and shared with the 
common law.30 Since the two systems were so distinct, Mignault 
argued, using one to inform the other was unnecessary and would 
only render each system less pure and coherent. The civil law, he 
maintained, was an internally strong and fertile system and there 
was thus no need to borrow concepts from the common law in order 
                                                                                                             
 28. Pierre-Basile Mignault, L’avenir de notre droit civil, 1 REVUE DU DROIT 
104, 116 (1922). 
 29. See, e.g., The Mile End Milling Co. v. Peterborough Cereal Co., [1924] 
S.C.R. 120 (Can.) [hereinafter The Mile End Milling Co.]; Colonial Real Estate 
Co. v. La Communauté des Sœurs de la Charité de l'Hôpital Général de Montréal 
(1918), 57 S.C.R. 585 (Can.) [hereinafter Colonial Real Estate Co.]; Magann v. 
Auger, supra note 14, at 193; Mignault, supra note 28. Mignault was not the only 
Supreme Court Justice who used this approach. Justice Brodeur, for instance, 
serving on the Court from 1911 to 1923, was also “vigilant on behalf of the civil-
law tradition” in his decisions. See SNELL & VAUGHAN, supra note 24, at 130. 
 30. Jean-Gabriel Castel, Le juge Mignault défenseur de l'intégrité du droit 
civil québécois, 53 CANADIAN BAR REV. 544, 545-549 (1975). 
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to answer civilian legal questions or develop principles.31 Instead, 
answers could be found within the civil law tradition, most notably, 
in the Civil Code, which Mignault believed to be internally con-
sistent and rational, as well as in doctrinal interpretations of codal 
articles.32  
Mignault believed that it was not only unnecessary but, indeed, 
undesirable to import common law principles into the civil law since 
doing so weakened the civilian tradition as a whole. Transplanting 
common law ideas into the civilian legal framework risked the in-
troduction of concepts that conflicted with existing civil law rules, 
causing contradictions and detracting from the system’s integrity, 
making an otherwise rational system impure and illogical.33 More-
over, he believed this endangered the tradition’s continued exist-
ence, warning that, “we should not forget the case of Louisiana.”34 
Mignault believed that Louisiana was losing its distinctive civilian 
tradition and implied the same might happen in Quebec if this im-
portation continued. As a result, Mignault was “of the opinion that 
each system of law should be administered according to its own 
rules and by reference to authorities or judgments which are binding 
                                                                                                             
 31. Pierre-Basile Mignault, Les rapports entre le droit civil et la common law 
au Canada, spécialement dans la province de Québec, 11 REVUE DU DROIT 201, 
205-206 (1932). 
 32. Castel, supra note 30, at 550-551. See also Regent Taxi & Transport Co. 
v. La Congrégation des Petits Frères de Marie, [1929] S.C.R. 650 (Can.) [herei-
nafter Regent Taxi]; Mignault, supra note 31, at 204-205; Pierre-Basile Mignault, 
Le Code civil de la Province de Québec et son interprétation, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 
104, 129-139 (1935). 
 33. Castel, supra note 30, at 546. See, e.g., The Mile End Milling Co., supra 
note 29, at 129, where Mignault criticized the respondents’ lawyers for citing 
common law authorities stating that, “it is not in this way that we will conserve 
Quebec civil law in all its integrity” (author’s translation) (“Ce n'est pas ainsi que 
l'on conservera dans toute son intégrité le droit civil dans la province de Qué-
bec.”). 
 34. Mignault, supra note 28, at 116 (“N'oublions pas le cas de la Louisiane.”) 
(author’s translation). Mignault was writing at a time when others were expressing 
similar concerns in Louisiana itself. In his article, Mignault based his opinion on 
a letter he received from a lawyer in Louisiana who explained that the common 
law was becoming increasingly influential within the state. See also, e.g., Gordon 
Ireland, Louisiana's Legal System Reappraised, 11 TULSA L. REV. 585, 596 
(1937). 
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on it alone.”35 The difference between Mignault’s and Taschereau’s 
approach is evident in Mignault’s dissenting opinion in Regent Taxi, 
a case that dealt with the same two articles of the Civil Code that 
Taschereau had interpreted earlier in Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
Robinson.36 Where Taschereau’s interpretation was based on a phi-
losophy of unifying different traditions, Mignault’s methodology 
was completely different as it focused on reconciling the apparently 
contradictory articles with one another, situating them within the ra-
tional framework of the Code.37  
Justice Mignault was not alone in this concern for the continued 
viability of Quebec civil law. Sylvio Normand’s study on the editors 
and authors of the Revue du Droit, a Quebec law journal published 
from 1922 to 1939, indicates a similar apprehension among numer-
ous Quebec jurists at the time.38 One of the major themes discussed 
in the Revue was the deep connection between Quebec’s heritage, 
society, culture and its civil law tradition, and the sense that this tra-
dition was under threat by common law influences.39 Like Mignault, 
participants in the Revue sought to protect Quebec’s civilian tradi-
tion by emphasizing its distinctiveness, discouraging the importa-
tion of common law principles, and developing legal concepts 
through the exclusive use of civilian sources. David Howes has ar-
gued that this staunch diversity approach has its drawbacks since the 
select use of such sources forces jurists into a narrow, text-focused 
interpretation of the law and ignores the benefits of attaining global 
consensus.40 However, it is clear that this diversification trend dom-
inated legal discourse in Quebec in the early twentieth century and 
undoubtedly played a large role in preserving the heritage of the civil 
law tradition in Canada.  
                                                                                                             
 35. Colonial Real Estate Co., supra note 29, at 603. 
 36. Regent Taxi, supra note 32; Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 14. 
 37. Regent Taxi, supra note 32, at 682-683. 
 38. Normand, supra note 3. 
 39. Id. at 562-564. 
 40. Howes, supra note 2, at 552-553. 
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V. THE CONTEMPORARY POSITION 
The unification trend of the Taschereau years and the diversifi-
cation model that followed at the time of Mignault’s tenure on the 
Supreme Court represent two opposing ends of the spectrum. How-
ever, neither movement is confined to one specific time in history 
nor, indeed, to one jurist, and one can discern evidence of both 
trends in Canada today.  
The unification mentality, while largely replaced by one of di-
versification, can still be found in decisions rendered many decades 
later, particularly in instances where the relevant legal concepts at 
issue had been transplanted from the common law into the civil law. 
For example, as recently as 1975, in a case emanating from Quebec 
dealing with the remedy of specific performance, the Supreme Court 
declared that, “the principles established in common law jurisdic-
tions [must apply in Quebec] since this is a remedy taken from 
them.”41 Similarly, in a 2007 decision of the Quebec Court of Ap-
peal dealing with judicial recusation, the Court condoned recourse 
to Canadian and foreign precedent, even going so far as to state it 
was incumbent to do so when Quebec law was silent on the subject, 
on the ground that the principles in question in the common law 
were similar to those in Quebec law.42 
Moreover, elements of the unification philosophy have recently 
surfaced in cases where the Supreme Court has explicitly noted the 
advantages of reconciling civil and common law principles. In a 
very recent set of cases on appeal from Quebec, the Court has re-
marked that the “natural convergence in principles and outcomes 
                                                                                                             
 41. Trudel v. Clairol Inc. of Can., [1975] 2 S.C.R. 236, 246 (Can.). This is no 
longer the interpretation given to the remedy of specific performance in Quebec 
law. See Royal Bank of Canada v. Propriétés Cité Concordia Ltée, [1983] R.D.J. 
524 (Can. Que. S.C.); Construction Belcourt Ltée v. Golden Griddle Pancake 
House Ltd., [1988] R.J.Q. 716 (Can. Que. S.C.); Varnet Software Corp. v. Varnet 
U.K. Ltd., [1994] R.J.Q. 2755, 2758 (Can. Que. C.A.). 
 42. Wightman v. Widdrington (Succession de), 2007 QCCA 1687, para. 58 
(Can. Que.). See also Droit de la famille – 1559, [1993] R.J.Q. 625, para. 11 (Can. 
Que. C.A.). 
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[between the civil and common law] is generally desirable,”43 and 
that the approach it adopted in a particular case, “[had] the ad-
vantage of being compatible with the most recent developments in 
the North American law . . . .”44 In a parallel to Taschereau’s claim 
regarding the consistency of damage awards across Canada in the 
1887 case of Canadian Pacific Ry. Co. v. Robinson, the Court, in 
2013, has even noted the advantages of assessing compensation for 
bodily harm on a similar scale in Quebec as in common law Canada 
on the premise that it “should not vary greatly from one part of the 
country to another.”45  
On the other hand, the diversification model has also endured 
and continued to develop well after Justice Mignault’s time on the 
Supreme Court. In 2014, the Supreme Court explicitly reaffirmed 
this approach, writing that, “the common law and the civil law 
[should] evolve side by side, while each maintains its distinctive 
character.”46 This model has even found a modern champion in Jus-
tice Louis LeBel, a judge of the Supreme Court from 2000 to 2014. 
LeBel, like his forerunner, Mignault, continued to stress the im-
portance of prioritizing civilian sources in civil law decisions, fo-
cusing particularly on the unique position of the Civil Code in Que-
bec law. Several of his judgments reaffirm that “the starting point is 
                                                                                                             
 43. Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SCC 
55, para. 52 (Can.) [hereinafter Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc.]. 
 44. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant v. Blouin, 2003 SCC 31, 
para. 22 (Can.) [hereinafter Caisse populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant]. 
 45. Cinar Corporation v. Robinson, 2013 SCC 73, para. 85 (Can.); Canadian 
Pacific Ry. Co., supra note 14. 
 46. Reference re Supreme Court Act, ss. 5 and 6, 2014 SCC 21, para. 93 
(Can.) [hereinafter Supreme Court Act, 2014]. This idea is also supported in the 
Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, a statute aimed at making federal law 
more compatible with the law of Quebec. The Act states: 
Both the common law and the civil law are equally authoritative and rec-
ognized sources of the law of property and civil rights in Canada and, 
unless otherwise provided by law, if in interpreting an enactment it is 
necessary to refer to a province’s rules, principles or concepts forming 
part of the law of property and civil rights, reference must be made to the 
rules, principles and concepts in force in the province at the time the 
enactment is being applied. 
Federal Law-Civil Law Harmonization Act, No. 1, S.C. 2001, c. 4, § 8.1 (Can.). 
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not the common law but the Civil Code of Quebec, which is the 
basic general law in Quebec, as provided for in the preliminary pro-
vision of the Civil Code,”47 and that, “the Civil Code is the jus com-
mune of Quebec.”48  
Like Mignault, LeBel has cautioned against the dangers of im-
porting common law principles into the civilian tradition without a 
careful consideration of how the principles in question would fit into 
a civilian framework.49 According to LeBel, “it would be extremely 
unwise to import, holus bolus, legal concepts that were developed 
in another system of law without first determining whether they are 
compatible with the rules that apply to civil liability in Quebec.”50 
He, too, believed that indiscriminate importation could cause con-
tradictions and thus undermine the coherence of the civilian tradi-
tion.51 Justice LeBel is not alone in expounding this idea. Caution 
against wholesale importation of common law principles permeates 
the discourse of civilian decisions penned by other Supreme Court 
justices, as well as those rendered by lower courts in Quebec.52 
                                                                                                             
 47. Gilles E. Néron Communication Marketing Inc. v. Chambre des notaires 
du Québec, 2004 SCC 53, para. 56 (Can.) [hereinafter Gilles E. Néron]. 
 48. Doré v. Verdun (City), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 862, para. 15 (Can.) [hereinafter 
Doré v. Verdun]. 
 49. Gilles E. Néron, supra note 47, para. 53 (“Courts should avoid needlessly 
importing or applying common law rules in a matter which, subject to the princi-
ples of Charter law, is governed by the procedure, methods and principles of the 
civil law.”). 
 50. Prud’homme v. Prud’homme, 2002 SCC 85, para. 54 (Can.). 
 51. Id. para. 58 and para. 63: 
[T]he defence of qualified privilege cannot be incorporated in that form 
into the civil law rules which are based on a presumption of good faith, 
without disturbing the coherence of its application in the area of public 
authority liability. . . . It is not only unjustified, but pointless, to import 
that defence into the civil law. 
 52. For an example of a Supreme Court decision, see Farber v. Royal Trust 
Co., [1997] 1 S.C.R. 846, para. 30 (Gonthier, J.) (Can.) (“Caution must be exer-
cised in adopting unreservedly common-law concepts of contract into cases aris-
ing under the Civil law, except where there is useful necessity and authoritative 
precedent.”); for an example of a lower court decision, see Anglo Pacific Group 
PLC v. Ernst & Young, Inc., [2013] R.J.Q. 1264, para. 36 (Can. Que. C.A.) (“The 
civil law is a complete system and one must guard against adopting principles that 
come from foreign legal systems without questioning their compatibility with our 
law.”). 
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Despite evidence of both philosophies in contemporary Cana-
dian jurisprudence, the predominant trend is that of diversity. With-
out question, the civilian tradition has not only survived but has en-
joyed a “renewal of [its] distinct legal culture.”53 Moreover, while 
the efforts of jurists such as Mignault and LeBel have been crucial 
in maintaining the distinctiveness of the civil law tradition, one can-
not ignore the social and political factors that have also contributed 
to this outcome.  
One reason that Quebec civil law has continued to remain dis-
tinct is that the civilian tradition in Quebec is inextricably linked to 
the French language. William Tetley has argued that the linguistic 
separation of traditions is one of the most important factors in keep-
ing legal traditions in mixed jurisdictions distinct.54 At the very 
least, a different language serves to ensure that jurists are aware of 
a tradition’s distinctiveness and separation from the other applicable 
tradition in the same jurisdiction. This linguistic separation is some-
what nuanced in Canada since both linguistic versions of the Civil 
Code are equally official, as are both English and French versions 
of Supreme Court decisions.55 However, Quebec civil law is linguis-
tically delineated from Canadian common law in the sense that the 
former is typically associated with the French language and the latter 
with English.56 While most Quebec jurists are bilingual, law is prac-
                                                                                                             
 53. John E.C. Brierley, The Renewal of Quebec’s Distinct Legal Culture: The 
New Civil Code of Québec, 42 U. TORONTO L.J. 484 (1992). 
 54. William Tetley, Mixed Jurisdictions: Common Law v. Civil Law (Codi-
fied and Uncodified), 60 LA. L. REV. 676, 727-728 (2000). 
 55. Doré v. Verdun, supra note 48; Constitution Act, 1867, supra note 7, § 
133 para. 2; Administration of the Court, SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, 
https://perma.cc/LUV9-5JKH. 
 56. There are exceptions to this rule. McGill University in Quebec teaches 
the Civil Law in English, while the University of Moncton in New Brunswick, as 
well as the University of Ottawa in Ontario, teach the Common Law in French. 
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ticed primarily in French in Quebec, and today the majority of judg-
ments are rendered in French.57 The bilingual nature of Quebec ju-
rists also enables them to engage with civilian sources in either their 
original French or English, particularly the French sources that in-
spired many principles in Quebec’s Civil Code. There exist, of 
course, civil law jurisdictions in the world that are characterized by 
the English language such as Scotland, Jersey, and Louisiana, where 
even the Louisiana Civil Code is published in English only.58 While 
this is not fatal to the continued viability of these civilian traditions, 
in addition to detracting from their linguistic distinctiveness, the re-
liance on translations of the tradition’s most important French 
sources makes it more difficult to maintain their autonomy.59  
Legal education in mixed jurisdictions with a civil law presence 
also plays an important role in preserving legal traditions and Que-
bec’s civilian tradition has remained distinct, in part, due to the legal 
education offered in the province.60 Jurists in Quebec must hold a 
civil law degree, or its equivalent, in order to be eligible to write the 
Quebec Bar exams and practice law in the province. Unlike some 
                                                                                                             
 57. This is only natural given that the majority of Quebeckers are franco-
phone with 79.7% listing their mother tongue as French, and 87% of the popula-
tion speaking French at home in 2011, see Statistics Canada, French and the fran-
cophonie in Canada—Language, 2011 Census of Population, 2 (2011), 
https://perma.cc/4K55-7CVY. 
 58. There is, however, a recent translation of the Louisiana Civil Code mak-
ing it available in French. See CODE CIVIL DE LOUISIANE ÉDITION BILINGUE (Oli-
vier Moréteau ed., Société de législation comparée 2017). See also Olivier Moré-
teau, The Louisiana Civil Code Translation Project: An Introduction, 5 J. CIV. L. 
STUD. 97 (2012).  
 59. For example, in Jersey, jurists are predominantly Anglophone but fre-
quently cite the works of the French author Pothier, often relying on a translated 
edition. See Timothy V.R. Hanson, Comparative Law in Action: the Jersey Law 
of Contract, 16 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 194, 202 (2005) (“French has become a 
foreign language in the Channel Islands, thereby making a perusal of the old 
French texts that bit more onerous . . . .”); The Jersey Law Commission, Report: 
The Law of Contract, 6 (2004) (“[T]he majority of Jersey residents are insuffi-
ciently fluent in French to be able to consider the relevant case law and text books 
. . . .”). See also Roger K. Ward, The French Language in Louisiana Law and 
Legal Education: A Requiem, 57 LA. L. REV. 1284 (1997) for a discussion of this 
phenomenon in Louisiana. 
 60. William Tetley, Nationalism in a Mixed Jurisdiction and the Importance 
of Language (South Africa, Israel, and Quebec/Canada), 78 TULSA L. REV. 175, 
189 (2003-2004). 
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other mixed jurisdictions, such as Louisiana, all Quebec law facul-
ties offer civil law degree programs, even if some offer the possibil-
ity of also obtaining a common law degree if students opt to pursue 
additional studies.61 At McGill University, all students graduate 
with both civil law and common law degrees, and its program, 
which is built on an integrated, or transsystemic, study of both civil 
and common law, offers a solid grounding in both legal traditions.62  
A very important factor in the survival of the civil law as a dis-
tinct legal tradition is Quebec’s Civil Code itself. Its successful 
modernization and recodification in 1991 has contributed greatly to 
the stature of the civilian tradition. The Civil Code of Quebec is not 
merely a modernization of the laws contained in the previous Code, 
the Civil Code of Lower Canada, which had been in place since 1866 
and which had grown less coherent over time with the addition of 
updates and amendments.63 The new Code also reflects a modern-
ized and distinctive view of Quebec’s civilian tradition, visible in its 
“substance, language and symbolism.”64 Both its tone and content 
offer an image of Quebec law that John Brierley has called “self-
sufficient,” presenting Quebec’s law as entirely autonomous from 
external influence.65 Brierley maintains that for this reason, the 
                                                                                                             
 61. For example, the Université de Montréal in Quebec and the University of 
Ottawa in Ontario offer their civil law students the possibility of completing an 
extra year and obtaining a common law degree. This is in contrast to, for instance, 
Louisiana, where students typically receive a common law education with some 
civil law courses in the curriculum and the option of obtaining a certificate in civil 
law. See Olivier Moréteau, De Revolutionibus, The Place of the Civil Code in 
Louisiana and in the Legal Universe, 5 J. CIV. L. STUD. 31, 51 (2012). 
 62. See Yves-Marie Morissette, McGill’s Integrated Civil and Common Law 
Program, 52 J. LEGAL EDUC. 12, (2002). See generally Navigating the Trans-
systemic, 50 MCGILL L.J. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (2005). 
 63. Sophie Morin, Quebec: First Impressions Can Be Misleading, in A 
STUDY OF MIXED LEGAL SYSTEMS: ENDANGERED, ENTRENCHED OR BLENDED 
165, 171 (Susan Farran, Esin Örücü, & Seán Patrick Donlan eds., Ashgate Publ’g 
2014). 
 64. Brierley, supra note 53, at 484. 
 65. Brierley argues that the Code presents this image by breaking explicit ties 
to the origins of its provisions that were derived from, or inspired by, other tradi-
tions or legal systems. Id. at 498-499. 
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Code is in fact an expression of “the philosophy of Quebec as a dis-
tinct society,” and a declaration of Quebec’s legal sovereignty over 
itself.66 This legal nationalism complements the political national-
ism present in the province of Quebec and underscores its recogni-
tion, by the rest of Canada, as a distinct society.67  
The new Code’s preservation of the civil law as a distinct and 
autonomous tradition is reinforced by the inclusion of a Preliminary 
Provision that proclaims the Code to be “the jus commune” of Que-
bec law and “the foundation of all other laws.”68 Brierley remarks 
that the Preliminary Provision indicates that the Code is “a reservoir 
of fundamental juridical precepts and essential legal values,” which 
makes it a valuable source not because it derives its authority from 
any external or antecedent legal source, but because it is inherently 
valuable.69  
The Preliminary Provision’s declaration that the Code is the 
“foundation of all other laws” and the “jus commune” of Quebec is 
entirely consistent with the approach advocated by proponents of the 
diversification model.70 In the opinion of Louisiana scholar Olivier 
                                                                                                             
 66. Id. at 496, 502. 
 67. See Adrian Popovici, Libres propos sur la culture juridique québécoise 
dans un monde qui rétrécit, 54 MCGILL L.J. 223 (2009); Roderick A. Macdonald, 
Reconceiving the Symbols of Property: Universalities, Interests and Other Here-
sies, 39 MCGILL L.J. 761, 810 (1994); Patrice Garant, Code civil du Québec, Code 
de procédure civile et société distincte, 37 CAHIERS DE DROIT 1141 (1996). 
 68. Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, Preliminary Provision (Can.): 
The Civil Code of Québec, in harmony with the Charter of human rights 
and freedoms and the general principles of law, governs persons, rela-
tions between persons, and property. The Civil Code comprises a body 
of rules which, in all matters within the letter, spirit or object of its pro-
visions, lays down the jus commune, expressly or by implication. In these 
matters, the Code is the foundation of all other laws, although other laws 
may complement the Code or make exceptions to it. 
 69. Brierley, supra note 53, at 500. See also H. Patrick Glenn, La Disposition 
préliminaire du Code civil du Québec, le droit commun et les principes généraux 
du droit, 46 CAHIERS DE DROIT 339 (2005). 
 70. See, e.g., Doré v. Verdun, supra note 48, paras. 15-16: 
[T]he Civil Code is the jus commune of Quebec. Thus, unlike statute law 
in the common law, the Civil Code is not a law of exception, and this 
must be taken into account in interpreting it. It must be interpreted 
broadly so as to favour its spirit over its letter and enable the purpose of 
its provisions to be achieved. . . . [T]he Code is also the foundation of all 
other laws dealing with matters to which the Code relates . . . . 
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Moréteau, the Preliminary Provision has successfully “re-center[ed] 
private law on the Civil Code” by reaffirming the Code’s primary 
importance in the civilian tradition.71 Moréteau views this approach 
as all-important in a society in which there are numerous legal 
sources that may compete with a code, and he has advocated for the 
adoption of such a preliminary provision in other codes, specifically 
Louisiana’s.72  
Finally, we cannot ignore the significance of the civilian judicial 
presence on Canada’s final appellate court. With three of the nine 
Supreme Court justices hailing from Quebec, “[t]he two legal tradi-
tions . . . continue to be living realities in the highest court of the 
land.”73 For all of these reasons, rather than being absorbed by the 
common law as was once feared, the civilian tradition has continued 
to thrive as a distinct and autonomous legal tradition in Canada. 
VI. THE INSPIRATION MODEL 
While the distinct nature of the civilian tradition is well accepted 
today, we are currently witnessing a new trend, from one of staunch 
diversification to one of inspiration. In recent years, we have begun 
to see a greater willingness among judges to look to the other legal 
tradition in their reasoning, with the result that comparative law be-
tween the two traditions has become a more important part of judi-
cial methodology in Canada. Unlike the earlier unification model, 
however, this trend is based on the premise that there is value in 
looking across legal traditions, not to unify them but, rather, to bor-
row ideas from one to inform the other. The inspiration model is 
perhaps most clearly articulated by Justice Stevenson as follows:  
This Court has the benefit of being the final court of appeal 
in a country that has two legal traditions: the English com-
mon law and the French civil law. Our two legal traditions 
                                                                                                             
 71. Moréteau, supra note 61, at 59. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Tetley, supra note 54, at 735. Tetley also notes the lack of any similar 
tradition in the United States of having Louisiana judges on its Supreme Court. 
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are independent and should not be confused. Concepts and 
solutions found in one tradition should not be imposed on 
the other tradition. But this does not mean that there is no 
place for comparative law on this Court.74  
As this passage indicates, this new trend of inspiration maintains 
the distinctiveness and integrity of the two legal traditions while, at 
the same time, acknowledging the mutual influence they can have 
on each other. It demonstrates that a comparative approach has the 
potential to encourage the cross-fertilization of ideas between the 
traditions while not detracting from the distinctive character of ei-
ther.75  
There is, however, a legitimate concern that this use of compar-
ative law may, in fact, cause a reversion to the nineteenth century 
trend of unification, with all the potential dangers to the civilian tra-
dition that this trend presented at the time.76 While one must 
acknowledge this as a serious potential danger, the inspiration trend 
can, nonetheless, be seen as a positive movement provided it does 
not repeat the mistakes of unification and builds upon the principles 
developed by jurists who have insisted on the importance of diver-
sification over the past century. An examination of recent cases 
demonstrates that there are three major reasons these dangers are 
indeed being mitigated. 
 
 
                                                                                                             
 74. Canadian National Railway Co. v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co., [1992] 
1 S.C.R. 1021, 1174 (Can.). See also Louis LeBel & Pierre-Louis Le Saunier, 
L’interaction du droit civil et de la common law à la Cour suprême du Canada, 
47 CAHIERS DE DROIT 179 (2006). 
 75. In White v. Central Trust Co. (1984), 7 D.L.R. 236, para. 27 (Can.), Su-
preme Court Justice LaForest J., as he then was, spoke of the judicial use of com-
parative law as a way to achieve “cross-fertilization.” This passage is cited in a 
discussion of the growing use of comparative law in the Supreme Court of Canada 
by another Supreme Court Justice, Gonthier J., see Gonthier, supra note 2, at 21. 
 76. Daniel Gardner, L'harmonisation des solutions en droit privé canadien : 
regard sur quelques arrêts de la Cour suprême portant sur le droit civil at the 15e 
Conférence Roger-Comtois at l’Université de Montréal, Montreal, Quebec (Apr. 
27, 2017). 
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A. The Use of “Caution” in Cross-Fertilization 
Judges who look to the common law to inspire their civil law 
decisions have insisted on using caution in this approach and have 
established limitations on the application of the common law in 
Quebec cases. First, there is a methodological limitation pursuant to 
which judges acknowledge that civilian sources and methodology 
are to be prioritized.77 Secondly, there is a recognition that any re-
sidual role played by the common law will not apply where it would 
contradict civil law sources, particularly the Code and the Quebec 
Charter.78 Finally, there is a translational limitation because today, 
Quebec judges are mindful of the need to adapt or translate bor-
rowed common law principles to fit within the particular context and 
contours of Quebec civil law.79 As a result, contemporary judges 
have demonstrated that the common law can provide inspiration in 
civilian cases when appropriate and when done in a manner con-
sistent with the civil law tradition.  
This cautious use of inspiration is evident in many judgments 
written by Justice LeBel who, as previously explained, was an ad-
vocate of the diversification approach. However, notwithstanding 
his general philosophy of prioritizing the civilian legal tradition, he 
recognized the potential usefulness of looking to the common law. 
As he stated in the 2010 Supreme Court decision of Globe and Mail, 
“if the ultimate source of a legal rule is the common law, then it 
would be only logical to resort to the common law, in the process of 
interpreting and articulating that same rule in the civil law.”80 He 
therefore found it acceptable to look to a common law doctrine to 
provide a framework for creating a journalist source privilege in 
Quebec. He did likewise in Union Carbide by using the common 
                                                                                                             
 77. Lac d’Amiante du Québec Ltée v. 2858-0702 Québec Inc., [2001] 2 
S.C.R. 743, paras. 37, 39 (Can.). 
 78. Globe and Mail v. Canada (Attorney General), 2010 SCC 41, para. 45 
(Can.) [hereinafter Globe and Mail]. 
 79. Baudouin, supra note 14, at 731. 
 80. Globe and Mail, supra note 78, para. 45. 
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law as inspiration for the creation of a settlement privilege in Que-
bec civil law.81 In both these cases, Justice LeBel looked to the com-
mon law to fill lacunae in Quebec law. This does not, however, in-
dicate an endorsement of the wholesale importation of common law 
principles since, as LeBel pointed out, “this [common law inspira-
tion] is, of course, premised on the fact that the interpretation and 
articulation of such a rule would not otherwise be contrary to the 
overarching principles set out in the C.C.Q. and the Quebec Char-
ter.”82 Similarly, in a 2014 decision, LeBel examined the common-
ality requirement in class action authorizations in common law 
cases, noting that the understanding of this common law framework 
was helpful in order “to clarify the relevance and scope of the prin-
ciples in question in the context of Quebec procedural law,” but 
stressed that “caution must be exercised.”83 This approach is not 
limited to the Supreme Court, nor to Justice LeBel. In a recent Que-
bec Court of Appeal decision, for example, Justice Dutil noted that 
even though a common law decision may not have any legal force 
in the civilian tradition, its spirit may be applicable in Quebec civil 
law as long as judges look to it with caution.84 
Even in cases where the Court has expressly emphasized the de-
sirability of harmonization between the legal traditions, it is careful 
to ensure that its judgments are consistent with civilian sources. For 
                                                                                                             
 81. Union Carbide Can. Inc. v. Bombardier Inc., [2014] 1 S.C.R. 800, paras. 
27-37 (Can.). 
 82. Globe and Mail, supra note 78, para. 45. 
 83. Vivendi Can. Inc. v. Dell’Aniello, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 3, para. 48 (Can.). 
 84. P.L. v. J.L., 2011 QCCA 1233, para. 36 (Can. Que.) (drawing inspiration 
from the Supreme Court case M.(K.) v. M.(H.), [1992] 3 S.C.R. 6, which estab-
lished flexibility in the start date of prescription for incest cases in common law 
jurisdictions) (as followed in Tremblay v. Lavoie, 2014 QCCS 3185, (Can. Que.)). 
See also Struthers v. Régie des marchés agricoles et alimentaires du Québec, 2015 
QCCS 5992, paras. 70-71 (Can. Que.) (where the Quebec Superior Court cites the 
common law Supreme Court decision of Hyrniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, which 
had interpreted the parameters of the motion for summary judgment, even though 
that particular procedure is not available in Quebec. Nonetheless, the Court drew 
inspiration from that case, justifying its decision to dismiss by citing the common 
principle of proportionality in procedure as the basis of its decision). 
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example, in the recent Jean Coutu decision, which concerned a re-
quest by contracting parties to have the court rectify their agreement, 
the Supreme Court looked to the common law’s equitable doctrine 
of rectification and declared that the harmonization of laws between 
common law Canada and Quebec was “generally desirable.”85 
Nonetheless, the decision itself, which refused rectification, is based 
on an analysis of articles dealing with the interpretation of contracts 
found in the Civil Code of Quebec and refers to a prior interpretation 
of these codal articles in an earlier Supreme Court case from Que-
bec.86 Similarly, in Caisse Populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant v. 
Blouin, a decision dealing with security on property, the Supreme 
Court noted that the decision had the benefit of “fostering a degree 
of uniformity in this area, one that is crucial to the conduct of nu-
merous business activities, while remaining faithful to the letter and 
spirit of the Civil Code of Québec and the civil law origins of the 
concept of pledge.”87 These cases indicate that while the Court has, 
of late, been willing to praise harmonization as a beneficial outcome 
or consequence of certain rulings, it continues to look first and fore-
most to the civilian tradition’s sources and seeks to avoid importing 
ideas that would be contrary to the civilian tradition. 
B. Divergence Where Appropriate 
While the courts have been willing to use the spirit of the com-
mon law to inform civilian cases in certain circumstances, it is im-
portant to note that they have also refused to do so in situations 
where a divergent result was necessary to maintain the distinctive 
character of Quebec law and culture. This idea was expressly in-
voked in the Supreme Court Reference, in which the Court’s inter-
pretation given to the statute governing the appointment of Supreme 
Court justices resulted in different rules for the appointment of 
                                                                                                             
 85. Jean Coutu Group (PJC) Inc., supra note 43, para. 52. 
 86. Id. para. 25. 
 87. Caisse populaire Desjardins de Val-Brillant, supra note 44, para. 24 (em-
phasis added). 
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judges from Quebec. In particular, the resulting interpretation meant 
that while a judge of the Federal Court of Canada could be appointed 
to fill one of the six non-Quebec seats on the Supreme Court, such 
judge could not be appointed to fill one of the three Quebec seats. 
The majority of the Supreme Court justified this difference by ex-
plaining that the wording of the statute was due to a historical com-
promise intended to “guarantee that a significant proportion of the 
judges would be drawn from institutions linked to Quebec civil law 
and culture,” and that the law must remain as such since, “the objec-
tive of ensuring representation from Quebec’s distinct juridical tra-
dition remains no less compelling today.”88  
The same attitude towards the province’s distinct history and 
culture was expressed in a 2013 case dealing with the constitution-
ality of certain aspects of Quebec’s marriage laws, in particular, 
those governing spousal support and division of family assets for de 
facto spouses. A de facto spouse challenged these provisions alleg-
ing that they contravened the equality provision in the Charter of 
Human Rights and Freedoms because in Quebec, de facto spouses 
were not entitled to claim spousal support or a division of family 
assets, whereas their married counterparts in Quebec, and fellow de 
facto spouses elsewhere in Canada, were so entitled. Here, Justice 
LeBel provided a lengthy analysis of the historical and cultural 
backdrop to marriage laws in the province stating that, “the entire 
history of societal and legal changes that have led to the de facto 
union becoming an accepted form of conjugality in Quebec . . . is 
essential if we are to understand the constitutional issue before us 
and consider it in its context.”89 Chief Justice McLachlin, who also 
endorsed the constitutionality of these laws, argued that while they 
were vastly divergent from the laws in other provinces, they were 
                                                                                                             
 88. Supreme Court Act, 2014, supra note 46, para. 93. 
 89. Quebec (Attorney General) v. A, 2013 SCC 5, para. 262 (Can.). In up-
holding the constitutionality of these laws, Justice LeBel wrote on behalf of four 
of the nine Supreme Court justices. Chief Justice McLachlin wrote a decision 
concurring in the result and thus, this outcome was endorsed by the majority of 
the Supreme Court. 
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part of a “policy goal [that] is important to Quebec,” stating that “the 
fact that Quebec has chosen a different policy than other provinces 
in keeping with its own history and social values does not make the 
law unconstitutional.”90  
These cases indicate both an awareness of Quebec’s legal and 
historical distinctiveness and a conscious desire not to undermine it, 
even if this results in a significant difference between Quebec law 
and the law in the rest of Canada. Thus, even while the Court moves 
towards a greater use of comparative law, and even lauds the har-
monization of law across Canada, it remains resistant to such ap-
proaches in situations where the distinctiveness of Quebec’s legal 
situation is at the core of the issue in question. 
C. Reciprocity in Cross-Fertilization of Ideas 
Perhaps one of the clearest signs that a new trend is emerging is 
that we are now seeing reciprocity in the use of comparative law. 
There are an increasing number of common law decisions that make 
reference to, and are inspired by, Quebec civil law. The Supreme 
Court failed to use the civil law as inspiration in common law deci-
sions even once during the nineteenth century unification period.91 
This is in contrast to today’s inspiration trend, which is a bilateral 
movement where the traditions serve as mutual influences on each 
other rather than as a tool to impose one tradition on the other. Two 
recent Supreme Court decisions are notable examples of this. In a 
2012 decision on appeal from the common law province of Ontario, 
the Court sought to clarify the “real and substantial connection” test 
for determining court jurisdiction in the private international law 
context. Justice LeBel, writing for the Court, rejected wide judicial 
discretion in favour of the creation of an appropriate framework to 
establish such connection based on “a set of relevant presumptive 
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connecting factors,” an approach that mirrored the regime estab-
lished in the Civil Code of Quebec.92 In order to develop this new 
approach, LeBel relied heavily on codal articles and discussed their 
interpretation in Quebec case law throughout the decision.93 This 
examination of the civil law clearly inspired the development of a 
new approach applicable in a common law jurisdiction. 
The second notable example is the 2014 case of Bhasin v. 
Hrynew, a decision that expanded the principle of good faith in con-
tract performance in Canadian common law, elevating it to the status 
of a general organizing principle.94 While the robustness of the com-
mon law duty of good faith created by the Supreme Court falls short 
of its broad and encompassing counterpart that has been developed 
in Quebec law, the decision is noteworthy given the historic reluc-
tance of the common law to recognize such a duty at all. In creating 
what Justice Cromwell called an “incremental advance”95 in this 
area of law, he found “comfort”96 in the Quebec experience, where 
a legally imposed duty of good faith has not “impeded contractual 
activity or contractual stability.”97 
One finds common law cases relying on the civil law for inspi-
ration in lower court decisions as well. For example, the reasoning 
in Opron Construction Co. v. Alberta, a first instance decision from 
the common law province of Alberta, drew heavily on an earlier Su-
preme Court decision emanating from Quebec, Bank of Montreal v. 
Bail Ltée.98 The Bail decision had been based on the civilian princi-
ple of good faith in the formation of contracts, which creates a pre-
contractual duty of disclosure, a principle that does not explicitly 
exist in the common law. Nonetheless, the Alberta court found that 
                                                                                                             
 92. Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, para. 78 (Can.). 
 93. E.g., id. paras. 107-108. 
 94. Bhasin v. Hrynew, 2014 SCC 71 (Can.). 
 95. Id. para. 29. 
 96. Id. para. 82. 
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there had been a failure to make adequate disclosure in the defend-
ant’s invitation to tender and that this failure amounted to misrepre-
sentation. It justified its use of the civilian decision as inspiration by 
pointing to the behaviour of the Supreme Court itself, noting that the 
Court “has recently emphasized the benefits of a comparative law 
approach between the two legal systems in Canada.”99 The Alberta 
Court found that the examination of the civilian case, the history of 
good faith in Quebec, and the articles of the Civil Code were in-
formative since, “while the [Bail] decision is based upon the Civil 
Code of Lower Canada, its reasoning finds common ground in the 
common law.”100 
Common law cases relying on the civil law for inspiration are 
not as prevalent as those where the inspiration moves in the other 
direction. One reason is that the majority of Quebec civilian deci-
sions, at the first instance and appellate levels, are drafted in French, 
making them less accessible to common law jurists from other re-
gions of the country who may be less comfortable with French de-
cisions than are their Quebec counterparts with decisions drafted by 
common law judges in English. The exception to this is Supreme 
Court decisions, which are published simultaneously in both official 
languages, and therefore it is not surprising that most of the civilian 
decisions being relied upon by common law judges are those from 
the Supreme Court.  
Nonetheless, we are witnessing an increasing willingness on the 
part of common law judges to reach out to the civil law for inspira-
tion. Moreover, in cases where this is done, the common law courts 
do not simply adopt the approach taken in the civil law. Rather than 
transplanting the civilian principles in their entirety into common 
law decisions, the courts use these principles as sources of inspira-
tion that help “nourish the [applicable] common law principles.”101 
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This represents a parallel with the civilian cases that use the com-
mon law for inspiration, indicating that jurists in both traditions feel 
there is educational value in looking across traditions, while ac-
knowledging that each tradition should, ultimately, remain governed 
by its own framework. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This paper has presented three major trends that exemplify the 
interrelationship between Quebec civil law and Canadian common 
law. The initial trend of unification of the late nineteenth century 
had the benefit of creating consistency in the laws across the coun-
try, but it carried a serious risk of emasculating the Quebec civilian 
tradition. The opposite trend of diversification that emerged in the 
early twentieth century had the advantage of preserving and protect-
ing the autonomy of the civilian legal tradition, but carried with it 
the risk of creating a narrow-minded and parochial vision of legal 
interpretation and development. 
The new inspiration trend, identified in this paper, also has ad-
vantages and risks. Its polyjural approach has the benefit of creating 
a rich cross-fertilization of ideas through the “encounter between le-
gal traditions”102 and “horizontal transjudicial communication.”103 
This has allowed both traditions to borrow and learn from the other 
in order to shape new legal principles. Of course, while we may rec-
ognize the positive effects of such an enlightened approach to judi-
cial methodology, we must always be alert to the risk of reverting 
back to the philosophy of unification. But as long as jurists are at-
tuned to this risk, and due regard is paid to maintaining the distinc-
tiveness and integrity of Canada’s civil and common law traditions, 
a sophisticated and careful comparative approach can yield positive 
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results through the mutual influence that legal traditions may have 
on each other. 
 
 
